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The mathematical event:  
Mapping the axiomatic and the problematic in school mathematics  
 
Abstract: 
Traditional philosophy of mathematics has been concerned with the nature of mathematical objects - 
or concepts - rather than events. This traditional focus on reified objects is reflected in dominant 
theories of learning mathematics whereby the learner is meant to acquire familiarity with ideal 
mathematical objects, such as number, polygon, or tangent. I argue that the concept of event – rather 
than object - better captures the vitality of mathematics, and offers new ways of thinking about 
mathematics education. In this paper I draw on two different but related theories of event articulated 
in the philosophies of Alain Badiou and Gilles Deleuze to argue that the central activity of ‘problem 
solving’ in mathematics education should be recast in terms of a problematic of events. 
 
Introduction 
 The concept of a mathematical event seems odd in a field dominated by symbolic 
notation and rules of inference. Mathematics, according to Whitehead (1911), attends to universal 
laws that transcend the “events of this ever-shifting world” (p. 4). Traditional philosophy of 
mathematics has concerned itself with the existence of mathematical objects, not the occurrence of 
mathematical events. The event is said to occur and the object to exist. Whereas existence of a 
mathematical object might be material or immaterial, depending on one’s philosophical approach, 
events are always ephemeral incidents, contingent on material circumstances, and full of action and 
motion and temporality. Unlike objects, events seem to gobble up space and time, taking up the flow 
of temporality and spilling out into surrounding space. Some have argued that events and objects 
share in the same ontology and simply differ by degree - both are material inhabitants of space-time, 
the object simply being a particular kind of event, one that is “firm and internally coherent” over time 
(Casati & Varzi, 2010). The objects of mathematics, however, are rarely considered a part of this 
spectrum, since they are often taken to be entirely free of spatio-temporal conditions.  
 The philosophical question of how mathematics participates in the spatio-temporal, or 
how mathematics comes to matter, is rarely addressed within education, despite it often being the 
source of student confusion. Students regularly struggle with attempts to mathematize temporal 
processes and events, whether they be age-old word problems about journeys between towns, the 
measure of rates of change, or exploring the probability of an event. Consider, for instance, the 
notorious ‘difficulty’ that students have in properly answering the question: “Compare the probability 
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of getting the pair 5-6 with the pair 6-6 when rolling two dice.” The vast majority of high school 
students state that the probabilities are the same, and that it doesn’t matter whether it’s the pair 5-6 or 
the pair 6-6, since the result of rolling each dice is independent from the other (Lecoutre & Fischbein, 
1998). Educational researchers who study how we might correct this ‘misconception’ suggest that we 
show students a 6x6 array of all possible outcomes of the two dice tossing, and offer a justification of 
the sort “look, there are two ways of getting 5-6 and only one way of getting 6-6” (see figure #1).  
 
                                                         
    Figure #1: Array representing throwing of two dice 
 
When students see the array they are forced to recognize, through counting, that the there are two 
outcomes for the pair 5-6 and only one for 6-6. The act of counting 5-6 as different from 6-5 strikes 
most students as wrong, but the array shows them how one might assess the event as though 
composed of two possible outcomes. The array functions very importantly here – it spatializes the 
possible outcomes in a two-dimensional framework, decomposing the event into two directions, and 
problematizing the assumption that the two dice are thrown together and perceived all at once. This 
form of justification detemporalizes the act of tossing the dice, and decodes the event in terms of a 
logical ordering rather than a temporal ordering. One can imagine how students might feel the tension 
between their sensation of the event and the assertion that there is a difference in order (a 5-6 pair 
counted as different from a 6-5 pair). I draw attention to this example as it points to how student 
perplexity is related to the awkwardness of mathematics in thinking the event. Logical and axiomatic 
relations tend to erase the temporal and ontological, even in this case, when the task attends to a 
spatio-temporal action. One can trace this tension between temporal and logical facets of 
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mathematical activity throughout the history of mathematics, comparing specific developments that 
grapple with the temporal, like the infinitesimals of Leibniz, with others that deny it altogether, like the 
axiomatization program of Peano (Châtelet, 2000; Deleuze, 1994). 
Deleuze (1993, 1994) and Deleuze & Guattari (1987) examined the history of mathematics, 
mapping the tensions between state-sanctioned or “royal” or “major” mathematics and alternative or 
counter historical lineages of mathematics, which are named “nomadic” or “minor”. According to this 
account, state mathematicians quelled the dynamic and nomadic strategy of flow associated with 
nomadic mathematics, and imposed “civil, static, and ordinal rules” on notions such as “becoming, 
heterogeneity, infinitesimal, passage to the limit, [and] continuous variation” (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1987, p. 363). Nomadic mathematics, according to Deleuze and Guattari, disrupted the regime of 
axiomatics through its emphasis on the event-nature of mathematics. In particular, nomadic 
mathematics attended to the accidents that condition the mathematical event or encounter, while the 
axiomatic attended to the deduction of properties from an essence or fundamental origin. In 
pragmatic terms, this means that nomadic mathematics dwells in the mathematical figure as an event 
rather than an essence or representation. The square is nothing but the process of quadrature. The 
curve is set free from an absolute metric and embraces and follows relational movement. Deleuze 
demands that we re-animate the figures of mathematics and set them in motion, so that we might 
resist the tendency to imagine transcendent references for mathematical figures and instead embrace 
their event-structure and immanence.  
In Difference and Repetition (1994), Deleuze opposes two kinds of deduction associated with 
these two entwined paths in the history of mathematics. In axiomatics (or theorematics), deduction 
entails the derivation of a set of theorems from a set of axioms. In problematics, deduction “moves 
from the problem to the ideal accidents and events that condition the problem and form the cases that 
resolve it.” (Smith, 2006, p.145). A problematics embraces the “ideal accident” of the square and the 
prime number, and any other mathematical concept, as an adventurous temporally unfolding process. 
Axiomatics, in contrast, treats the figure and the number as static and staid - in Platonic fashion - in 
terms of its essence and its derived properties. As Deleuze (1994) explains, “the reason is that 
theorems seem to express and to develop properties of simple essences, whereas problems concern 
only events and affections … as a result, the genetic point of view is forcibly relegated to an inferior 
rank” (p.160). He cites Proclus’ delineation between the theorematic and problematic conceptions of 
geometry, where the latter is defined with reference to the events (sections, ablations, adjunctions, 
etc) that come to “affect” the subject matter (circle, ellipse, line, etc), “whereas the theorem deals with 
the properties which are deduced from an essence”(p. 54). Smith (2006) offers the example of the 
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line, suggesting that “Euclidean geometry defines the essence of the line in purely static terms that 
eliminate any reference to the curvilinear (‘a line which lies evenly with the points on itself). 
Problematics, by contrast, found its classical expression in the ‘operative’ geometry of Archimedes, in 
which the straight line is characterized dynamically as ‘the shortest distance between two points’” 
(Smith, 2006, p. 148). We can see that the Archimedean definition allows for a multiplicity of 
curvilinear paths between the points, and defines straightness, rather than line, in terms of distance 
travelled or movement (de Freitas, 2012a). Smith suggests that such a definition marks the line as a 
continuous operation and a “process of alignment”. Similarly, the circle is a process of rounding, the 
square a process of quadrature, and so on. “In problematics, a figure is defined dynamically by its 
capacity to be affected – that is, by the ideal accidents and events that can befall the figure 
(sectioning, cutting, projecting, folding, bending, stretching, reflecting, rotating, and so).” (Smith, 2006, 
P.149). Axiomatics, however, prevailed over problematics (through Euclid) as a “triumph of the 
rectilinear over the curvilinear”, and a triumph of essence over event, the latter being seen as the 
deterioration of the essential form. Desargues’ attempt to develop a mathematics of the problem-
event, for instance, in his Draft Project of an Attempt to Treat the Events of the Encounters of a Cone 
and a Plane, was opposed and marginalized by the algebraic or analytic geometry of Fermat and 
Descartes (Smith, 2006). The projective geometry of Desargues was judged “dangerous and 
unsound” because of its reliance on the diagrammatic and its operative approach to mathematical 
figures (Smith, 2006, p. 150). Despite that fact, this kind of physico-mathematical approach would find 
favor in the nineteenth century with Monge and Poncelet, but always as a threat to the dominant 
analytic tradition and epsilon-delta police whose aim was to rescue axiomatics from the threat of this 
destabilizing mathematics of the animate or vibrant problem.  
 My aim in this paper is to rethink the nature of the event in mathematics so that educators 
can attend more carefully to the ways that our engagement with mathematics entails a problematics. 
Focus on the materiality of this engagement allows us to better study the mutual entailment of 
mathematics and subjectivity. Rethinking mathematics in terms of the event allows educators to 
bracket the dominant logic of necessity and orient their attention towards the question of how the new 
is introduced into mathematics classrooms. This shift in attention requires a new philosophy of 
mathematics education, one that troubles the traditional assumptions about the status of ‘universals’. 
Mathematical universals - concepts like squareness or primeness or straightness - are typically 
contrasted to particulars or individual instantiations. One often hears the claim that a particular 
drawing of a square is an instantiation of the universal property of squareness. This claim, however, 
forever demotes the drawing or act of drawing as a mere copying of a more perfect and disembodied 
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square that determines or prescribes the nature of any individual square. In lieu of a discussion of 
properties like squareness or primeness that are said to be universals, this paper argues that we 
should attend to the incident of squaring (or becoming prime) as an event. In other words, I argue that 
such an event is not an instantiation of a universal, because the process of instantiation fails to 
capture the creative and material act of individuation that is entailed when we do mathematics. My 
aim is to rethink mathematics as a place of events where creativity and contingency prevail, and 
where the indeterminacy and undecidability at the source of the event is embraced rather than 
banished. 
 I draw on two different approaches– that of Alain Badiou and Gilles Deleuze – and argue 
for an image of mathematics where the concept of event is central. By looking to the history of 
mathematics, and identifying moments that might qualify as eventful, these two philosophers develop 
very different but related approaches to the very idea of event. I borrow some of their insights, and 
cobble together a proposal for the study of problem solving as a mathematical event. In order to flesh 
out this proposal, and show how the philosophical issues are at work in our everyday encounters with 
mathematics, I use the “first-person” research methods developed by Roth (2012) in his study of the 
phenomenological aspects of learning mathematics and science. Roth notes that first-person 
introspective reflection was precisely the kind of method that Merleau-Ponty (1968) and Nancy (2006) 
used to shed considerable light on the nature of spatio-temporal aspects of experience. In social 
science research, however, empirical research dominates the field and has largely shunned these 
other kinds of methods. Like Roth, my first-person method strives to analyze my own encounters with 
mathematics “in such a manner that more general conditions of knowing and learning are exhibited” 
(p.4). My approach, however, shifts away from traditional phenomenology, drawing extensively on 
Deleuze so as to treat the non-human (mathematical concepts) as animate folds of the event. As a 
means of reflecting on the nature of mathematical activity, I focus on one mathematical problem and 
describe my engagement with it and show how this engagement relates to the concept of event. In 
the last section, I relate these ideas to work in mathematics education research, and describe how 
the axiomatics/problematics tension operates in curriculum policy. 
 
Eventhood: Naming and annulling 
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 Theorizing the event has a long history in philosophy. Recently Badiou (2011) – who 
describes himself as a kind of Platonic materialist1 - leverages contemporary set theory as a basis for 
theorizing ontological questions about being and events, arguing that space, time and society can be 
theorized through the concepts of set membership, the power set, complementarity, etc (Badiou, 
2006, 2009, 2011). One has to keep in mind these set theoretic relations as one explores his 
development of the concept of an event. It seems difficult to imagine an event in a landscape of sets 
constructed so as to avoid any inkling of motion or action, but Badiou suggests that events are 
composed of elements that do not belong to the encompassing situation and cannot, for that reason, 
take place across the entire situation. An event interrupts a situation, disrupts the functioning of a 
discourse, and insists on its own opacity to analysis. It is this latter insistence on its status as 
dysfunction that makes it difficult to name. We aim to represent the event, but it insists on presenting 
itself. And yet what saves the event from oblivion is a semiotic intervention that names the event as 
belonging to the situation. As Feltham (2008) suggests, intervention for Badiou is any naming 
procedure that marks the event as belonging to the situation “without annulling its eventhood” (p. 
103). The naming brings the event into the linguistic realm, but the name itself must be radically new 
to language or there would be no change in the situation. A new element must be introduced into the 
recombination of signs, something initially awkward that bumps up against the rules of signification, 
so that we are constantly forced to consider the extent to which this event belongs to this situation.  
 Badiou offers the example of the introduction of the imaginary root  by the 
Italian mathematician Cardano and others in the 16th century. Complex roots for polynomials were 
controversial at the time, and the very idea of naming such a thing made many mathematicians 
uncomfortable. Chuquet (1445-1500) showed that some equations lead to imaginary solutions, but 
dismissed them, stating “tel nombre est ineperible” (such a number is nonsense). Cardano (1501-
1576) used solutions to polynomials yielding square roots of negative quantities, but called them 
“sophistic” and said they were “as subtle as they are useless” (Brown, 1998). Complex roots were 
introduced to enhance the study of equations, but their emergence is a good example of an event that 
enters the discourse of mathematics through a naming procedure and is then repeatedly considered 
and encircled as a recalcitrant obstacle upon which an entire theory of complex numbers emerges. 
The naming doesn’t “quell the undecidability” (Feltham, 2008, p. 103) of the event once and for all, 
                                                 
1
 He offers a counter-reading of Plato that reclaims the idea and the realm of ideas as a site of eternity and 
multiplicity (Badiou, 2011).  
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but puts the event into motion across the situation, allowing it to grow and saturate the situation. 
Indeed, Arkady (2012) points out how even current planar representations of complex numbers (the 
Argand plane), don’t really capture or adequately visualize the structural relations between these 
numbers. The complex plane breaks with the habits of what he calls “Euclidean mathematics” in that 
it can’t map nicely onto a geometry of phenomena, despite it being put forward, by Gauss and others, 
as a way of legitimizing these kinds of numbers. In Badiou’s historical account, the imaginary root 
remained a “conceptual inexistent” until a mutation in habits of calculation (occurring over a long 
period of time) granted it being-there status in this world (Badiou, 2011, p. 62). The event, for Badiou, 
is thus a site from which a “truth” can emerge. Events of this caliber are rather rare in life and in 
mathematics, as they must be adequately intense and strongly obstinate in that which they bring 
forth. These events are incorporated and subjectivized in the work of individuals like Cantor, Cardano 
and Galois. Such mathematicians troubled the very foundations of their contemporary’s mathematical 
practice by “raising up” an “inexistent” mathematical entity that had no prior existence nor name. As 
Badiou states, an event is “a perturbation of the world’s order (since it disrupts the logical 
organization – the transcendental – of this world), as the raising up of the inexistent attests” (p. 91).  
 Setting aside the appeal to Platonism, and the fact that a set theoretic rendering seems 
absent of action,2 this depiction of the mathematical event is a powerful way of describing the 
rupturing nature of invention in the history of mathematics. I want to leverage this image in rethinking 
the learning of mathematics and suggest that one can study mathematical activity by pointing to how 
a “conceptual inexistent” rises up in a situation and, once named, it begins to saturate the given 
discourse. But what exactly is a “conceptual inexistent”? How can I leverage this idea without it being 
tied to some ideal Platonic form hovering over us? How can we speak of a “conceptual inexistent” 
without falling back on the concept of a transcendent form? Moreover, in the case of , 
the inexistent cannot be the “imaginary root”, since that, by necessity, has already been named when 
it is announced. If we aim to speak of the event prior to naming, but without Platonic transcendence, 
then we have to shift our attention to the problems (not solutions nor naming) that constitute the 
mobility of the event. The problem as problem carries with it the undecidability and dysfunctionality 
that are the engines of the event. It is the pursuit of a solution to the given equations that constitutes 
the event for Cardano. The problem affirms its opacity to analysis by refusing determination and 
                                                 
2
 Hence the move by Badiou towards the mathematics of Category theory where there are both 
objects and arrows. 
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pursuing its flight and movement. Problematizing the act of finding roots of an equation inserts a 
movement into the situation that causes the mathematical discourse to vibrate and stammer. A 
problem, therefore, is at the source of a mathematical event. This is true at the historical level, but 
also at the level of the classroom where mathematical problems are taken as common place.  
 Take a simple problem: show that a square can be dissected into 1989 squares.3 I found 
this problem in a book, and it travelled with me for weeks. It refused me, kept me out, perturbed me. I 
set it down to attend to other things, and would be drawn back into it later. At first, I tumbled into an 
easy and incorrect interpretation, thinking that I merely had to write 1989 as the sum of squares. 
Since 1989 (not being a perfect square) was a little bigger than , I wrote, 
. There was, of 
course, an immediate disconcerting feeling, a nagging sensation, that my doing so hadn’t attended to 
the (physical) constraints of the problem, and that I had entirely overlooked the spatial constraint that 
these squares must dissect a square. What would that look like? It was evident that my solution, a 
solution that came too easily and was suspiciously convenient, and also wrong, could not dissect the 
square in a clean way. The problem affirmed its opacity to analysis – my analysis – and thereby 
sustained a sort of intrinsic undecidability, destabilizing whatever mathematical discourse on which I 
was able to draw. My arithmetic was made to tremble and stammer as I realized my blind spot in not 
considering the need to dissect a square. The problem became a recalcitrant obstacle (with 
indeterminate borders) and pushed back, reshaping the terrain of my mathematics, functioning like an 
attractor for all my thinking, speaking, doodling. I quickly found a square factor of 1989, so that I might 
write 1989 = 9 x 221, which allowed me to divide the original square into nine squares, although the 
structure of each of these remained indeterminate. Still, this felt like progress. I now had to 
decompose each of the 9 squares into 221 smaller squares. Again, 221 was not a perfect square, so 
the dissection would involve squares of different sizes – introducing an asymmetry into a perfectly 
symmetric container, that being the square in all its obstinate squareness. I began to draw squares 
(figure #2), and to physically carve up the squares with my pen, looking for some sort of iterative 
pattern (a kind of dissecting machine) that might be made to generate 1989 squares. I began to feel 
like I was burrowing into the problem, literally digging up its materiality and moving piles of numbers 
around the problem space.     
                                                 
3
 Fomin, D., Genkin, S., Itenberg, I. Mathematical circles: Russian experience. 
 9 
 
          
  Figure # 2: Excerpt from attempts at engaging the problem  
 
 Since my engagement with this problem was not likely to bring about some monumental 
creation of a new mathematical entity that would revolutionize mathematics, it seems difficult to map 
Badiou’s theory of the event onto my experience. Indeed, focusing closely like this on a more 
mundane experience with a mathematical problem (like the kinds encountered in classrooms) doesn’t 
seem to suggest the dawning of a conceptual inexistent as form but the affirmation of a material 
indeterminism that lies at the source of all our actions and concepts. This indeterminism is indeed 
inexistent in precisely the way an event is inexistent – events occur rather than exist. This is an 
important point - indeterminism and mobility occur rather than exist. Thus an event partakes of 
becoming but not being. In my attempt to attend to the event-nature of mathematical encounters of 
the everyday sort, I have to wrestle the event away from its association in Badiou with the emergence 
of both truth and determinate form. I am not, however, denying the emergence of truth and form on all 
such occasions, as might occur when a student discovers an established or new theorem through 
investigation. But my aim is to map the event-structure of the everyday problem – the problem that 
doesn’t promise to unveil some fundamental structural entity. In such instances, I believe that the 
event qua event is my engagement with the problem, in other words, the event entails my coupling, 
submission, and sensory entanglement with a problem which is itself at play and in the process of 
becoming. In the case of dividing a square into 1989 squares, my engagement involves the 
destabilizing of my subjectivity and a concommitant problematizing of the concept of squareness. 
This problematizing of squareness, the perturbation of the concept, reflects the power of the problem 
to punch through discourse to the murky and mobile world of indeterminacy. In other words, the 
problem is an event of perturbation of a concept. Thus the problem became a problem only when it 
shook my cherished assumptions and set my mathematical discourse trembling with indeterminacy. 
 A perturbation of a mathematical concept introduces temporality into what was taken as 
eternal. How might we then recast our mathematics so that it attends to the event-structure of these 
entities and concepts? We would need to re-write the dense noun phrases that saturate our math 
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textbooks using verbal phrases instead. But would that be sufficient? In the next section I turn to 
Deleuze who suggests that verbs destabilize the static ontology of objects, and asks that we consider 
what happens when we undo the adjective and return to the activity of the verb. What if we were to 
speak of the green tree as the occurrence “the tree greens”? What if we lived in a world where 
numbers were always becoming individuated in some manner (both actualized as prime, odd or 
square and counter-actualized against the canon)? Why not perceive the ebb and flow of becoming 
prime rather than the quality of being prime? And why not then invite the counter-actualizations that 
are too often banished from the mathematics classrooms, those being the untimely becomings that 
refuse the fixity of the canon?  
 
The temporality of the event 
 Here I turn to Deleuze’s approach to the event as it seems to be better suited to the 
discussion of everyday mathematical events of the kind discussed above.4 For Deleuze, events are 
quite common occasions where creative and inventive actions occur, actions (both human and non-
human) that then organize and structure the behavior around them, whereas for Badiou events are 
rare historical moments when a Truth rises up (Bowden, 2010). We have seen above how the event 
for Badiou has no formal place in a given situation and therefore resists recognition. Deleuze shares 
this commitment to the dislocating nature of events, a commitment that denies the event any well-
defined spatio-temporal location. Deleuze’s approach in Logic of Sense, however, sets the event 
travelling in time away from the present, moving infinitely back into the past and infinitely forward into 
the future. For Deleuze, the event is a change in intensity where the virtual and the actual re-combine 
and the effects of this change multiply and proliferate the many futures of the situation. This approach 
lends itself to the study of smaller actions at the micro-level of activity, tracing the way these fold into 
significant changes in a situation. From the Stoics, Deleuze takes a philosophy of change that 
decenters substance and privileges flow, indeterminacy, alteration and mutation. He argues that 
events are ontologically primitive in that substances are derived from them. The event is free and 
without determination – its ontological reality is the virtual. The virtual is the movement or mobility or 
dynamism that is at the heart of all our actions. The event escapes the trappings of the present in its 
potential movement (back and forth) along an uncountable and indeterminate set of temporal 
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 In Logic of worlds (2009), Badiou briefly discusses Deleuze’s theory of the event, as articulated in the book 
The logic of sense (Deleuze, 1990), summarizing what he considers to be Deleuze’s “axioms” of a theory of the 
event, and then contrasts these with his own axioms. Many scholars (Bowden, 2011; Smith, 2005; Williams, 
2009) have identified the ways in which Badiou entirely misrepresents Deleuze’s concept of the event. 
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directions. It is this potentiality that determines the change that has occurred or will occur. The 
event is thus never fixed in a present moment, but rather a moving and unraveling thread trailing off 
behind and ahead. Events are the manifestations of singularities or disruptions in the norms of 
behavior in a situation, and they function as unconditioned magnets or attractors that re-organize the 
spatial practices and actions of those around it. In other words, events put indeterminism to work like 
an engine, re-arranging and re-entangling the threads of spatio-temporal unfolding. Like exhalation, 
they operate through break-down, but like inhalation, they affirm a directionality.  
 Consider the same problem of dissecting a square into 1989 squares. My path through 
this problem reveals how this break-down and affirmation unfolds. As I sustained my engagement 
with the problem, I began to map a lineage of related problems along one thread, identifying problems 
that might have come prior to it, often deemed “simpler” or “subsidiary”, problems that participate in 
the same kind of indeterminacy, but in lesser degree. Was it possible to dissect a square into any 
given number, even or odd? I drew a series of squares (Figure #3) and tried to divide them into five, 
or six or seven squares, and so on, repeating the request, and studying the way the problem evolved. 
In so doing, I split and splice the various threads of the event that were woven through each of these 
“sub-problems”. The original problem participates in the spatio-temporal flow of material actions I had 
taken or would take. I reached back into the history of this event, drawing 4x4 and 3x3 squares, and I 
reached ahead beyond the current focus on 1989 towards the case of any number.  I found myself 
stretched along one such extended event, repeatedly dividing squares into an even number of 
squares by partitioning off a corner with an L-border around it. This sequence of actions congealed 
into a solution to a problem that was never formally posed (“can you always divide a square into an 
even number of squares?”), and yet it was a problem that somehow participated in the emergence of 
my 1989 problem. I spliced this trailing thread of events into another, pursuing the potential of 
generating an odd number of squares. I drew another square and partitioned off a central square with 
a border to get 13 squares, and I repeated the action to generate 17 squares (Figure #4), but after 
doing so I realized this method didn’t furnish me with the case for 15 squares.  
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     Figure #3 The L pattern. 
                                                                                                   
      
           Figure # 4: A central square. 
 
 Although I am dwelling on my actions and how these actions pursued a thread in time, I 
want to underscore that Deleuze has a dispersed theory of subjectivity, whereby the situation rather 
than the subject undergoes events. Rather than focus on the subject, it is the system of linkages (the 
assemblage) that reacts to stress and increased intensity. Events happen through people, rather than 
to them (Williams, 2009). Events intersect with the many other series that flow through the subject. In 
 13 
the foregoing activity I emerge as a mathematical subject (no matter how novice) rather than my 
being the subject who then acts. For both Badiou and Deleuze, events figure crucially in the 
individuation of subjects. Without events, we lose the significance, that is, the activity or mobility or 
intensity, by which a subject congeals and amalgamates. Williams (2009) suggests that both Badiou 
and Deleuze problematize theories of agency altogether, since there seems to be no will, no 
intention, no centering of agency in an individual act. Following this decentering of human agency, a 
mathematical subject is not a site for cognition and performance, but rather a meeting or series of 
encounters. As Williams (2009) explains, change is more primary than the subject who congeals 
through change; the subject becomes a unified entity when it is part of change. Thus change, 
difference, and movement are more primary than position. My engagement with the 1989 problem, 
therefore, must be seen as part of a series of actions that are expressive of various kinds of intensity 
and flowing energy across the situation rather than willful results selected by an agent. Although 
Deleuze and Badiou have different ideas as to how (and why) this dispersal of energy occurs, they 
seem to share a similar commitment to studying the complex multiplicity of forces at work in any 
situation.  
 Where I find Deleuze more compelling for a theory of learning particularly relevant to 
mathematics is in his emphasis on creativity or inventiveness (or the bringing forth of the new) 
through problems and paradox. The event, for Deleuze, must be seen in terms of the problem or 
problematic idea rather than in the terms of a truth or a solution. In The logic of sense, Deleuze uses 
the work of Lewis Carrol on logic, language and mathematics to map alternative ways of thinking 
about sense and non-sense. The book draws on Stoic and Leibnizian philosophies so as to introduce 
a fourth dimension to language, called the “sense-event” which both grounds and destabilizes the 
various manners by which meaning is made, those being denotation (causal links), signification (truth 
conditions), and manifestation (personal stake). The sense-event is precisely that which will sustain 
the circle that binds these three components together. As such it cannot be subsumed within a theory 
of possibility (conditioned by logic) but must instead be “unconditioned [and] capable of assuring a 
real genesis” (Deleuze, 1990, p. 19). The event subsists and is expressed in language but is prior to 
any logical determination or reference. It is crucial to note that Deleuze is pointing to the inadequacies 
of language and any theory of language (or representation) in addressing the nature of events. He is 
reclaiming “sense” from the linguists and troubling the meaning of the term by showing how paradox 
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and bodily event are buried in it.5 My scribbling on the page as I attempt to grapple with the 
problem (to make sense) must be seen as that which animates the problem without ever exhausting it 
or fully determining it.  
And yet Deleuze argues that states of affairs, qualities and quantities are a part of substance, 
and that the incorporeal (the event) is sterile, “impassive”, ineffective and on the surface of things: 
“The Stoics discovered surface effects”(p.7). Against depth and height, irreducible to bodies and to 
ideas, the “incorporeal event” frequents the surface: “There is nothing behind the curtain except 
unnameable mixtures, nothing above the carpet except empty sky” (p. 133). The event is the 
“impassive” site (neither active nor passive) where action proliferates into all of its possible unfolding. 
Events grow like crystals along their edges. The event is thus a site of paradox. Indeed paradox is the 
“dismissal of depth, a display of events at the surface, and a deployment of language along this limit.” 
(p.9). The möbius strip offers a useful model for this sort of disorientation or “sterile splendour” in that 
it is only one surface – a surface where things and language meet - and yet one’s direction is 
reversed when one returns to where one started. One must cut the möbius strip in order to make 
sense of its directionality in relation to an external set of axes, but one can also live on the strip and 
incorporate a moving set of axes on the surface so as to make intrinsic sense. “The agonizing aspect 
of the pure event is that it is always and at the same time something which has just happened and 
something about to happen; never something which is happening.” (Deleuze, 1990, p.63). 
 
Problems: the source of events 
 In Difference and Repetition (1994), Deleuze draws on the philosopher of mathematics 
Albert Lautman’s theory of the problem or problematic idea. According to Lautman, a problem has 
three aspects: 
 
Its difference in kind from solutions; its transcendence in relation to the solutions that it engenders 
on the basis of its own determinant conditions; and its immanence in the solutions which cover it, 
the problem being the better resolved the more it is determined (Deleuze, 1994, 178-9).  
 
Solutions to a problem - be they numbers, triangles or relationships - are at source spatio-temporal 
dynamisms or dramatizations of the indeterminacy that characterizes the problem. The triangle is 
progressively determined through the actualization of this virtual space of movement and dynamism. 
                                                 
5
 According to Smith (2005, 2006), this issue is poorly grasped by Badiou in his reading of Deleuze on the 
event.  
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The problem consists of the indeterminacy prior to complete resolution or actualization. Lautman 
goes on to suggest that problems or problematic ideas emerge in relation to a set of dialectical 
opposites (even/odd, whole/part, continuous/discrete) for which resolution is never fully granted. And 
although these opposing notions transcend mathematics,6 he argues that mathematics itself can give 
birth to the new through the mixes and amalgamations of diverse theoretical embodiments of these 
opposites. Consider, for instance, the way that parity (even/odd) functioned thus far in my 
engagement with the problem above. Or, to offer a more historically significant example, consider the 
way parity functions as a creative force in the ancient Greek proof of the irrationality of radical 2. The 
proof works through contradiction (assuming the opposite of what it aims to prove, deducing a 
contradiction, and thereby concluding that the initial assumption was wrong). In assuming that radical 
2 is rational, one deduces the existence that a number is both even and odd - an impossibility! Thus, 
it must be the case that radical 2 is not rational. Even-odd parity is the engine by which the proof 
functions, and it is also the force that engenders the irrational number. Parity is precisely the kind of 
instrument that functions simultaneously to work on both the logical level and the material or 
ontological level. It marshals logical constraints and creates mathematical entities. Parity is leveraged 
in this famous proof to unleash and make actual the virtual (the irrational number) while operating 
according to the laws of legitimate inference. The proof is the making of something – quite literally, a 
sculpting or creative activity that brings the new number into being. But it is also, of course, a process 
by which the possible is realized. The sculpting tool of parity works in both the realm of the possible 
and the realm of the material.  
Problems have both this ontological and logical element – they bring forth the new while also 
delineating the possible. Treating them only as obstacles to solutions detracts from this ontological 
creative aspect. Deleuze follows Lautman in troubling the usual coupling of problems to solutions. 
The traditional model for mathematics education is to consider the problem as given or ready-made 
and to consider the solution that which will dissolve the problem (Brown, 1998). From this traditional 
perspective, the difference between problem and solution is one of degree, and “the problem simply 
contains less of the solution than the solution does.” (Durie, 2006, p. 171). Such an approach to 
problems doesn’t honor the problem as a site of creation and genesis, and focuses instead on the 
skills and psychology of those who may or may not solve it. To see the problem as lacking sufficient 
solution, suggests that what’s at stake are “failures of recognition” on behalf of the knowing subject, 
                                                 
6
 The solutions are immanent to mathematics, but the problems transcend mathematics. Both 
Deleuze and Badiou use this approach to go backwards, through the solutions found in mathematics, 
to the problems of interest to philosophy. 
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who fails to recognize the solution in the given problem. Deleuze argues that thinking is not a 
matter of (mis)recognition, but rather an encounter. The difference between recognition and 
encounter is gigantic - the former binds us to epistemological concerns while the latter delves into the 
ontological nature of thinking. If learning is an encounter, then the problem rebuffs my thinking not 
because I fail to recognize the solution in it, but because I encounter its material otherness through 
my senses, and I experience the limits of my senses in so doing. In these kinds of encounters we 
experience the limit of the sensible, and it is this encounter that forces us to declaim the problem as 
problem. Problems are thus acts of constitution and investment, arising from the encounter with the 
limits of sensibility. Here we are inverting the usual lineage whereby right/wrong falls out of the 
solution, and arguing that the contours of right/wrong are in fact constituted by the problem itself.  
I moved in and out of the problem of 1989 squares. I encountered the limits of sensibility 
through my reaching out and feeling the contours of the problem – those limits were encountered in 
its visibility on the grid paper, its spatial partitioning, its movement back and forth along a line of 
potential patterns, its insistence on irregularity and asymmetry. It wasn’t that it withheld its solution – 
masked it like a secret – but rather it came alive with intensity and pulse, dispersing energy across 
the lines of engagement (and lines of flight) along which I moved, sometimes haltingly. When I was 
able to feel the alternating pulse of the problem – the back and forth between the balanced 
arrangement of a perfect square with the internal irregularity of each square in relation to the others – 
my pace slowed and I dwelled without haste or anxiety near the limits of the sensible. And although I 
wanted a solution – indeed the prompt is exactly this, to pursue a solution or “show” how a solution 
can be obtained – I didn’t feel that the solution was hidden or masked, but that the problem was the 
engine or source (the genetic element) that was bringing forth my actions. Aesthetic considerations 
caused me to explore the partitioning of 221 into 4 squares, each with its own internal and distinct 
partitioning. Why partition it into 4? Why not 9 again? Rather than appeal to intuition, the best answer 
is that I wanted the problem to unfold with a partitioning of 4. It was my desire to produce a solution 
that partitioned the first square into 9 and then each of those 9 into 4 squares. The desire and the 
problem were mutually entailed. I was unaware that my problem was part of a long tradition of similar 
problems, nor was I aware that there might be other ways of pursuing this problem. The 1989 
problem was in fact part of a lofty lineage - In 1770, Lagrange had proven that any natural number 
can be expressed as the sum of four integer squares. Others had explored variously related problems 
– the number theorist Emil Grosswald published an entire book in 1985 on the topic of representing 
integers as sums of squares. I knew none of this. My emotional attachment to the problem and the 
manner by which I entered it linked less to my knowledge of the field, and more to the mutual 
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entailment of my (limited) knowledge with the structural conditions of the problem itself. Picking up 
my pencil once again, I wrote down a sequence of square numbers: 4, 25, 36, 81, 64, 16, 9 … looking 
for groups of four that when added would furnish a number whose last digit was 1 (to make 221). I 
found myself writing the numbers 121 and 100 since I knew these were squares. But 100 seemed to 
resist my attempts at decomposition into an odd number of squares. Distracted, I shifted away from 
this particular set of numbers, choosing instead 144 (always beginning with a big square, so as to 
limit the choices for the others), and found these four that worked ( ). My reasoning 
was far from sophisticated. What stands out is how this encounter with the problem was in large part 
driven by an aesthetic and sensory energy – the making of a prolonged event. I felt joy at having 
found one such arrangement of four squares (to be repeated in each of the nine squares), and I drew 
the image of my solution (figure #5), and only then did I wonder whether this was the only way to 
dissect the square into 1989 squares.  
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       Figure #5 
 
In this act of wondering whether there are other dissections, the problem is further infused with 
intensity and new lines of flight erupt. After all, I had produced a dissection, but the question asked for 
a demonstration that such a dissection was possible rather than asking for a dissection. I had worked 
materially through the making of a solution, but the question was about the logical possibility of a 
solution. The problem was asking me to make my material method more machinic, to abstract from 
my fumblings and design more of an operative process that might work the freedom of possibility so 
as to produce or actualize solutions as multiplicities.  
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For Deleuze, it is our tendency to forget problems once they are solved, to erase the 
memory of the problem and idolize the solution as abstract and originary that leads us into the dry 
world of propositions. In abandoning the problem, the proposition claims an abstract general 
universality (Deleuze, 1994, p. 162). As Alunni (2006) suggests, Deleuze’s complex binding of ideas 
with problems is meant to decenter the solution and rethink the concepts of transcendence and 
immanence. All too often we construe the solution as the particular or discontinuous in relation to the 
continuity of the context within which the problem was articulated. Durie (2006) points out that 
Deleuze tries to avoid the binary between universal and instantiation (or particular) by characterizing 
the problem in terms of indeterminate multiplicity. An indeterminate multiplicity is unlike a set in that 
the latter “maintains a relation to a certain external principle (or essence) which determines the 
elements of the set (the set of whole numbers, for instance)” (Durie, 2006, p. 174). In contrast, an 
indeterminate multiplicity submits to fundamental “laws” that govern the kinds of relations between 
elements, but these laws are “wholly indeterminate” with respect to the form of the elements 
themselves (Durie, 2006, p. 174). Within a multiplicity there are singular and regular elements – but 
their singularity and regularity is determined through their relationships rather than their specific form. 
Durie offers the example of a curve changing at its maximum, where the relationship between the 
singularity and the regular points in its neighborhood together constitute the curve (p. 175). He also 
refers to Poincaré’s notion of an attractor or singularity to which a dynamic system will tend when it 
falls within the basin of attraction or neighborhood of pull. The problem is conditioned by an 
indeterminate distribution of singularities, and differs in kind from the determinate specification of 
particulars that constitute the solution of the problem. For instance, the 1989 problem, so simple and 
yet so taxing, is conditioned by the relations between numbers rather than by the numbers 
themselves. Instead of universals, Deleuze sees these as material relations. Parity, divisibility, and 
squareness are indeterminate of the actual entities that crystallize as I work the problem, although 
they condition and inform the cases under study.  
The relational ontology that underpins the problem points to the mobility and dynamism that 
sustain an event as an event. For Deleuze, this mobility is a mark of the virtual or potential expressed 
through the problem. Deleuze argues that such an approach makes the problem both transcendent 
and immanent to the solution, that is to say, the problem is an indeterminate system of differential 
relations (occupying a virtual or potential space) and also incarnate in the actual relations articulated 
in the solution (Deleuze, 1994, p. 163). Problems are more than solutions cloaked in a fog of 
confusion. The essence of problems is not their solution. Fetishizing the solution as essence is what 
leads us every time into transcendentalism. We pay tribute to the solution and erase all memory of its 
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originating problem, and suddenly we claim prior unflinching status for the result. The imaginary 
roots put forth in the 15th century – that which is named as the solution – abandon the messy 
problems from which they emerged, and are made to join the pure untainted world of ideal forms. It 
doesn’t seem fair to the problems! Instead, Deleuze (following the philosopher Albert Lautman) 
demands that we see how solutions are not definitive, but remain shackled to their problems, carrying 
with them the conditions that set them in motion. “Problems are the differential elements in thought, 
the genetic elements in the true” (Deleuze, 1994, p. 162). What would be gained (and lost) in 
mathematics education if we tried to keep in mind the “reciprocal presupposition” that couples 
solutions and problems? How do we keep at play the internal genetic structuring of the problem itself, 
the way in which the problem is a site of creation? The vast majority of mathematics classrooms are 
places of consensus, rather than places of inventiveness and experimentation. Why does 
mathematics education work so hard to maintain a culture of axiomatics and not problematics? 
  
Into the classroom 
During the last few decades, mathematics education researchers have promoted “problem-
based lesson plans” as a model that works in mathematics classrooms (citation). Various studies 
have shown how experiences with “non-routine” problem solving and “problematizing” can improve 
teacher confidence about mathematics and encourage students to take risks with their ideas (Hiebert 
et al, 1996; Hiebert et al, 1997; Selden, 1989). Brown and Walter (2005) have argued that cultivating 
a habit of “problem posing” engenders a more adventurous approach to mathematics problems as 
alterable situations. Crespo (2003) has shown how this kind of facility with problem-posing can alter 
teacher practice significantly. The literature on problem-posing in mathematics education consistently 
produces studies of rich classroom interaction where students are invited to experiment with 
diagrams and produce conjectures about shapes, numbers and other ‘mathematical entities’ and 
relationships. The work on problem-posing resonates with the Deleuzian argument of this paper, 
suggesting that educators should treat problems as sites of creativity and invention, and less as that 
which must be resolved to make way for the solution. Despite the insights of this research, however, 
and despite the evidence that mathematicians themselves operate in this way, mathematics 
classrooms remain sites of compliance where regimes of truth enforce an axiomatic image of 
learning. In most classrooms, the problem remains a mere curtain covering up the rigid atemporal 
mathematical concept behind it. Why is it so hard to embrace a problematics of mathematics problem 
solving? 
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The answer relates in part to the particular ways in which curriculum is construed in policy 
documents. The 2011 U.S. Common Core Standards promotes a new emphasis on “conceptual 
understanding of key ideas” and yet the document supports an image of mathematics as axiomatics. 
Citing concerns about a curriculum that is “a mile wide and an inch deep”, as well as the “conceptual 
weakness” found in most U.S. textbooks, the Common Core document pushes for less procedural 
mastery and more in depth conceptual work. They argue for the need of a “coherent” curriculum that 
addresses “the deeper structures inherent in the discipline” (Schmidt, Houang & Cogan, 2002, p.4). 
The Common core claims to present the key ideas in mathematics and to show how the “organizing 
principles” like place-value and the rules of arithmetic “structure those ideas”. This policy move is 
meant to address the over-emphasis on skill mastery in mathematics classrooms, where students 
perform procedures without demonstrating any other understanding of the associated meanings. I am 
not arguing against such an aim, but I want to draw attention to the tacit assumptions at work in their 
appeal to the “inherent” structuring of concepts. The authors of the document rely on a theory of 
learning trajectories or “learning progressions” in order to create a new “sequence of topics and 
performances”. In so doing they correlate supposed cognitive behavior (learning) with mathematical 
concepts, stating “the development of these Standards began with research-based learning 
progressions detailing what is known today about how students’ mathematical knowledge, skill, and 
understanding develop over time.”(p. 4). This model of learning progressions is teleological in that it 
assumes that learning is a developmental progression towards a ready-made concept, thereby fixing 
the goals for the learner and emptying the concepts of any vibrancy and indeterminacy. Moreover, the 
document makes the usual contrast between procedural mastery and “understanding”, and although 
this is effective in directing teachers’ attention to how they are overly invested in “rote learning”, it can 
also be taken up as a manual/mental binary that locates understanding in the heads of those 
sufficiently privileged to participate in what we consider “higher-order” understanding 
(Walkerdine,1988). In addition, and especially relevant to the ongoing tension between the 
problematic and the axiomatic, the authors of the document describe “understanding” in terms of 
“justification and explanation”, revealing a bias towards the logical foundation of certainty in 
mathematics rather than the aesthetic or creative elements entailed in mathematical practice. Of 
course explanation and justification are important aspects of mathematical practice, but they operate 
in tension with other aspects, like inventive diagramming, problem-posing and rule-breaking (de 
Freitas & Sinclair, 2012). Explanation is also associated with teacher emphasis on verbal 
communication skills in the classroom and the privileging of the alpha-numeric over other modalities 
(de Freitas, 2012b). My point here is not to advocate that we abandon all explanation, but to show 
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how the axiomatic continues to be privileged in curriculum policy through the working of this 
pedagogical demand. The impact of this on the enacted curriculum can be seen in the fixing of the 
mathematical concept (squareness, primeness, odd-even parity) as the rigid structural element that 
determines the inferential unfolding of activity. According to this model, learning is a process of 
coming to recognize these concepts, to abstract them away from the messiness of their instantiations, 
and submission to the rules of inference. As a way out of this static treatment of the concept, Cutler 
and Mackenzie (2011) suggest a “pedagogy of the concept” by which they aim to revise concept as a 
material and ontogenetic device – much like the way Deleuze talks about the event. According to this 
approach, learning is less about recognizing concepts, and more about encountering concepts (or 
becoming concepts). The provisional assemblages of concept-human that emerge in classrooms are 
indeterminate processes of becoming that cannot be captured in the “learning progression” model. 
Indeed, concepts operate through mobility and creative processes of bringing forth the new.  
 
Perhaps the real challenge to Cartesianism lies not in reconfiguring how we know what we know 
but in dethroning the epistemological project itself by considering the body of knowledge on the 
same material plane of existence as the lived and the physical bodies? Perhaps the challenge is 
to treat learning as an ontological rather than an epistemological problem? (Cutler & MacKenzie, 
2011, p. 63). 
 
 The new core curriculum refuses to engage with the indeterminacy and undecidability of 
mathematical concepts, treating them instead as rigid timeless truths that students will either 
recognize or misrecognize. This is due in part to the “alchemy” of curriculum policy whereby various 
material practices that occur outside of schools are packaged into school knowledge (Popkewitz, 
2004). Alchemy tends to involve a radical overhaul of the actual material practice, transforming these 
practices into prescriptions about legitimate forms of thinking. In the case of mathematics, one 
particular alchemic transmutation entails centering the axiomatics and banishing the problematic. The 
argument in this paper is meant to show how problematics is at the heart of mathematics, but that it is 
regularly confined and constrained by the tendency towards axiomatics. By pursuing the 
mathematical event, my aim is to bracket our ongoing commitment to the verification of truth (through 
justification and explanation) so that we can imagine how a problematics might figure more 
prominently in school mathematics. The philosophers of mathematics Corfield (2005) and Baker 
(2009) have both argued for the notion of the mathematical accident, suggesting that such a notion 
allows us to rethink the nature of mathematical practice. The very idea of an accidental truth runs 
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counter to the usual assumption that mathematics pertains to necessary truths, or in the least, 
analytic truths, and it breaks with the assumption that explanation is the measure of all mathematical 
meaning. Many mathematicians will speak of “mathematical coincidences” or “mathematical 
accidents” when referencing a fact that seems uncanny. For instance, the fact that 1828 occurs twice 
in the first 10 digits of the decimal expansion of e might be deemed a coincidence since its 
appearance is surprising. An accident, unlike a coincidence, might be an event of some significance 
that breaks with all causal connections and direct determination. An accident is a kind of event, one 
that is deemed, in retrospect, to be fully undetermined. Baker (2009) argues that the degree to which 
an adequate explanation exists determines whether a mathematical fact should be considered an 
accident. Since many mathematicians still find brute case-crunching computer proofs somewhat 
unsatisfying, there are today significant mathematical facts that would be considered accidents. Baker 
(2009) cites Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, pointing out how these results seem to make space 
for unprovable truths:  
 
My presumption has been that there may well be mathematical truths such as the Goldbach 
Conjecture, that are both mathematically interesting and are accidental either because they are 
unprovable or because their best proof is highly disjunctive. There may, in other words, be 
interesting mathematical truths that are true for no reason (Baker, 2009, p.153). 
 
While some mathematicians might bracket the coincidence or the accident as simply a sign that we 
are in need of a better axiomatic or encompassing theoretical approach, I take from Baker a 
willingness to see accidents as affirmative sites of disruption, as engines for inventive mathematics, 
as problematic ideas that make the laws of inference tremble and quake. It’s not that we are simply 
lacking an adequate explanation or unifying superstructure, since that would demote the problem to 
an unfortunate obstacle to be overcome as soon as a solution can resolve it. The accident is the 
perfect problem, since it draws us down into the muck of perplexity and insists that we reckon with the 
prospect of the irresolvable. Deleuze (1990) draws a distinction between events and accidents, where 
the latter is the manifestation of the event in a state of affairs. The event is an “ideational singularity”, 
but it is realized in a spatio-temporal state of affairs (p.53). It’s not the case that the event is 
problematic, but that problems are the condition of the event. As Smith suggests (2006), “it is the 
nature of axiomatics to come up against so-called undecidable propositions, to confront necessarily 
higher powers that it cannot master”(p. 158). Problematics is then the form of experimentation by 
which mathematics brings forth these accidents.  
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Pursuing a problematics in the classroom entails an encountering of mathematical 
accidents, an opening up to affective investments, and an inventiveness that embraces the aesthetics 
of mathematical practice. The National Council of Teachers of Mathematics (NCTM) has consistently 
put forth curriculum recommendations regarding standards for mathematical practice. The process 
standards, for instance, list “problem solving, reasoning and proof, communication, representation, 
and connections.” Intended to capture the kind of cognitive or intellectual labor entailed in doing 
mathematics, none of these process standards have captured the deeply material activity of a 
mathematical problematic. NCTM has also specified particular proficiencies, and while many of these 
point to the importance of adaptive, strategic and flexible ways of engaging with mathematics, and 
thus might support a problematics of problem solving, the over-all agenda is to develop in students a 
“productive disposition” aligned with an axiomatic image of mathematics. Such a disposition is 
defined in terms of a “habitual inclination to see mathematics as sensible, useful, and worthwhile, 
coupled with a belief in diligence and one’s own efficacy.” If taken at it’s word, this highly rationalist 
and utilitarian perspective cannot reckon with the non-sense and paradox that fuels experimental 
thinking in the field, nor grapple with the indeterminate materiality of mathematical concepts. A more 
inventive and aesthetic mathematics allows students to engage with the material substance of 
knowing, by attending to the ways in which the body bumps up against an object of knowledge less 
as that which is (mis)recognized, and more in terms of coupling, encountering and disrupting space-
time relationships. As Deleuze (1994) suggests, “Something in the world forces us to think. This 
something is not an object of recognition but of a fundamental encounter” (p. 139). 
 
Conclusion 
Perhaps the relation between mathematics and humanity is best thought in terms of a double 
problematic – on the one hand, “that of problematizing human events, and on the other, that of 
developing as various human events the conditions of a problem” (Deleuze, 1990, p.55). Indeed, the 
recreational mathematics that I pursue here, and that Deleuze studies in the work of Lewis Carroll, 
offers this double aspect. I entered into the problem of 1989, not only or even primarily to solve it, but 
to assemble with it, engage in its trailing history and its potentialities, to tap into the genetic element 
of the problematic; for surely mathematics shouldn’t be simply about “solving supposedly given 
problems, [but] methods of invention appropriate to the constitution of problems” (Deleuze, 1994, p. 
161).  
I have argued that the work of Badiou and Deleuze help us theorize problem solving in 
mathematics in terms of the event, and that such an approach makes room for new approaches to 
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teaching and learning problem solving in mathematics. The event is contrasted to the entity or 
object because of its durational aspect, genetic element, activity, indeterminism and undecidability. 
Together these present an alternative way of thinking about problem solving that has less to do with 
uncovering a secret (or acquiring knowledge of an eternal entity) and more to do with creatively 
bringing forth the new. The problem of dissecting a square into 1989 squares functioned as a site for 
studying the nature of mathematical problem solving. By focusing on my various forays into this 
problem, I was able to show how the experience of problem solving was an engagement with the 
limits of the sensible and a movement along generative lines of flight. My detailed description of the 
actions I took as I engaged with the problem show how, even in this trivial case, problem solving 
entailed the perturbation of concepts and the mapping of their event structure. For Roth (2012), first-
person methods are rigorous studies of consciousness at the point of its emergence, allowing a 
researcher to attend to the immanence of embodied engagement. For me, this method allowed for a 
way of sustaining my attention on the ways that the problem figured prominently in conditioning my 
activity, and perhaps more importantly, I was able to depict how engagement with a mathematical 
problem entails an ontological element that doesn’t pay lip service to a learning trajectory. Curriculum 
policy always seems to enforce an axiomatics on mathematics practice, refusing to allow for a 
problematics of conceptual indeterminacy and creativity. My hope is that this experiment in self-study 
has troubled taken-for-granted assumptions about mathematics problem solving, and has shown how 
we might rethink mathematics as event.  
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